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Abstract—Wireless ad hoc networks are an important topic
in the automotive domain. Thereby, strict security requirements
lead to high effort for verification of digital signatures used to
secure message exchange. A popular approach to limit such effort
is to apply verify-on-demand schemes. However, we show that
verify-on-demand requires much more cross layer dependencies
than identified before. Moreover, a massive denial of service
weakness of this kind of verification mechanism is found. Thus,
we recommend to prefer verify-all schemes over their verify-on-
demand counterparts.
Index Terms—Verify-on-Demand, VANET, Security;
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are a topic of high
interest, as they promise to increase future safety of driving.
Wireless data exchange and realtime requirements of safety
critical use cases require strong but yet efficient security
mechanisms for VANETs. This even holds for the so called
Day 1 use cases, for which mass deployment is planned within
upcoming years [1]–[3].
To provide authenticity and integrity of exchanged mes-
sages, these are typically signed using primitives of asym-
metric cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
However, high numbers of received broadcast messages pose
performance problems for signature verification at receivers.
Realization of hardware verification modules capable of ver-
ifying all received messages under high node density is still
challenging [4], [5]. Thus, mechanisms for reducing the num-
ber of required verifications have been looked at.
Verify-on-demand (VoD) performs a relevance check for
the message, which is only verified after is was identified
to be relevant, i.e., its contained information is to be used
by the receiver. [6] suggests to derive the relevance check
directly from the decision making process of applications.
This is based on the design of the US WAVE (Wireless
Access in Vehicular Environments) standardization framework
and extension of this scheme to the ETSI ITS (Intelligent
Transport System) standards has not been looked at in detail
[7]. Moreover, it is assumed that a relevance decision only
affects a single message [6].
We show that the need for authenticated data sets does
not only arise from within the application layer, but also
from other protocol layers. Moreover, introduction of VoD
leads to a complex set of dependencies between function-
ality on different protocol layers. Furthermore, we find that
introduction of VoD significantly decreases the burden for an
attacker to perform a denial of service (DOS) attack on a
VANET. Additionally, the discovered DOS weakness can be
well targeted to dedicated nodes without significant influence
on other nodes, which differentiates the attack from other
common DOS attacks in VANETs.
Related work is looked at in Section II. General security
considerations about VoD are given in Section III. Sections
IV and V study cross influence between VoD and routing
functionality as well as certificate handling, respectively. Af-
terwards, Section VI proposes a dedicated DOS attack on VoD.
Finally, Section VII provides a conclusion about this work.
II. RELATED WORK AND ATTACKER MODEL
The VoD concept is introduced in [6] as an alternative to
a verify-all scheme. Thereby, a verify-all scheme is character-
ized by verification of all received messages before these are
handed over to further message parsing. In contrast, VoD only
verifies messages after a demand for usage of their content
has been identified. The impact of VoD on overall security in
VANETs is only studied very briefly in [6]. Some background
about the VoD concept is given in [7].
VoD was initially proposed for WAVE, i.e., in connec-
tion with information dissemination via BSMs (basic safety
messages). In contrast, ETSI ITS uses CAMs (cooperative
awareness messages) for cyclic data distribution as well as
DENMs (decentralized environment notification messages) for
on demand information dissemination [3]. Moreover, WAVE
does not describe a way to store the content of received
messages, while ETSI ITS uses an LDM (local dynamic map)
to store dedicated VANET messages.
[8] proposes an implementation of the VoD concept for
ETSI ITS by storing signatures alongside with corresponding
messages in an extended LDM. Moreover, the LDM also hands
over messages to the security entity for verification and stores
the corresponding result to avoid multiple verification of a
single message. However, our analysis in Section IV shows
that this approach leads to massive cross layer dependencies.
Dedicated network layer protocols for VANETs have been
developed. Thereby, a major difference between WAVE and
ETSI ITS is the support for multi-hop communication, which
is only available in ETSI ITS. Within ETSI ITS the term
GeoNetworking is commonly used, as network layer routing
in VANETs is often based on geographic properties of the
vehicular environment. Two major concepts for forwarder
selection exit. Firstly, the sender of a message can select the
next hop, e.g., by greedy forwarding [9]. Secondly, the sender
can be selected in a decentralized manner, e.g., by contention
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based forwarding (CBF) [10]. The influence of VoD on multi-
hop communication has not been regarded in prior work.
DOS attacks on VANETs are a well known issue. Typically,
jamming or misuse of certificate dissemination features is used
to raise the channel load in a dedicated area in a way to cause
ordinary communication to become at least unreliable or even
brake down completely [11], [12]. [6] argues that DOS attack
surfaces of the VoD scheme do not increase the vulnerability of
the VANET, as VANET security could be always attacked by
this kind of attacks. In contrast, we show that VoD significantly
reduces the burdens of an attacker to perform a DOS attack.
Moreover, the attacker does not even need to violate channel
usage regulations and dedicated targeting of single vehicles is
possible, which is not the case for prior found DOS attacks.
The attacker is assumed as an active advisory using a
single communication unit. This means he can receive, store,
modify, create and send arbitrary messages at a single point
in the network. However, the attacker has no access to valid
credentials to sign his messages.
III. GENERAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS OF DATA
HANDLING UNDER A VOD SCHEME
In general, it is recommended to keep the interface exposed
to an attacker as small as possible. For example, [13] argues
that the format of the security envelope of ETSI ITS should
be adjusted to avoid parsing of its content before signature
verification takes place. With VoD, the whole message gets
parsed on all protocol layers before the decision on whether
to verity the message is done [6]. In contrast, verify-all
only exposes low level data processing interfaces up to the
network layer security entity. Thus, the surface for an attack
on data parsing and usage is increased massively by VoD in
comparison to a verify-all scheme.
Within ETSI ITS the data sets on various protocol layers
use much more complex encoding in comparison to WAVE,
for which VoD was proposed. Thereby, protocol layers above
the MAC layer use variable length data sets and deeply nested
data types [14]–[16]. On the facility layer ASN.1 encoding,
e.g., UPER (unaligned packed encoding rules) for CAM and
DENM, is used. Parsing of data sets with such complex
encoding schemes requires complex implementations leading
to many possibilities for security problems. Even for much
simpler ASN.1 schemes, like BER (basic encoding rules),
many security problems have been found in the past, e.g., the
BERserk vulnerability [17]–[20].
Thus, the effort for secure implementation of all function-
ality handling received data is significantly increased by using
VoD in comparison to a verify-all scheme. This puts the VoD
concept into question from a system design perspective.
IV. INTERACTION OF VERIFY-ON-DEMAND AND
NETWORK LAYER PROTOCOLS
In the following we separate the discussion of VoD’s influ-
ence on the network layer into the impact on VANET specific
GeoNetworking and IPv6 over GeoNetworking.
A. GeoNetworking
VoD influences greedy forwarding and CBF for multi-hop
communication. Such forwarding algorithms need to keep
track of locations of nodes in their surrounding [9]. Thus,
each received message leads to an update of a neighborhood
table. For greedy forwarding members of the neighborhood
table are possible forwarders. In case a forwarder gets selected,
the message containing the last known position of this node
needs to be verified. Otherwise, an attacker could cause
forwarding to non existent bogus nodes (neighborhood table
poisoning). This would clearly harm further dissemination of
the message’s content. This affects received messages which
should be forwarded as well as multi-hop messages generated
by the node itself (e.g., DENMs).
In case of CBF, the neighborhood table is used to determine
whether the own node is a possible forwarder of the received
message, i.e., forwarding by the own node causes progress
towards the destination. This is required as the prior sending
node’s position is not contained in a multi-hop message [15].
Thus, its position is determined from the neighborhood table
using its MAC address. This requires a verification similar to
the case of greedy forwarding. Otherwise, an attacker could
foil the CBF algorithm by either causing incorrect forwarding
or causing failure to forward by the attacked node.
A significant problem of neighborhood table keeping in
connection with VoD is the possibility to cause bogus updates,
which replace valid entries in the table. Thereby, an attacker
uses the ID of a valid node for its own faked messages. In
the worst case, a neighborhood table contains no valid entries
at all, due to such an attack. To avoid such an attack, mainly
three countermeasures can be thought of.
1) One could verify all messages before the neighborhood
table update. However, this disables VoD completely, as
every message gets verified.
2) Instead of replacing entries in the table, one could keep
prior entries, too. Old entries are only removed after
a later update got verified. However, this significantly
increases memory requirements, due to an expected low
number of verifications.
3) One could only store entries in the neighborhood table
after the corresponding message got verified. However,
low numbers of verifications will cause neighborhood
tables to be (very) sparse. Thus, it can be expected that
routing will suffer significantly from such an approach.
Thus, usage of a combination of multi-hop communication and
VoD is not recommended.
Furthermore, all received messages, which a node wants
to forward, have to be verified in advance to forwarding,
independent from the used forwarding strategy. This is done
to avoid creation of bogus channel load by an attacker [15],
[21]. ETSI ITS does not change the signature of a forwarded
message. For VoD two main cases have to be distinguished.
1) Verification of a node’s position data for forwarding
needs to verify a prior received and stored message. Only
a central (i.e., cross layer) storage of full messages can
avoid multiple verification of the same message by stor-
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ing the verification result. However, such an architecture
introduces an extra dependency of the network layer and
the message storage.
2) Verification of a received and to be forwarded message
splits again into two cases depending on relevance of
the received message for the receiver.
a) A receiver outside the message’s relevance area
only forwards it. Thus, the message is not stored in
the LDM, as it never reaches the facility layer. It
is only handled by lower layers up to the network
layer. Hence, the network layer needs to cause
verification by the security entity.
b) A receiver inside the message’s relevance area
hands the message over to higher layers and for-
wards it. Thus, it gets stored in the LDM and the
network layer causes its verification, as in case 2a.
In case an application finds a message’s data to be
relevant, it can be used without further delay, as it
has already been verified.
Using the LDM as the messages’ storage, as suggested in [8],
causes a cross layer dependency of network and facility layer
as well as interactions of both entities with the security entity.
Hence, separation of layers and uniqueness of responsibilities
within the protocol stack suffers from such a design.
Instead we recommend a message storage within the cross
layer security entity. It can provide a common interface for
message verification for all protocol layers.
B. IPv6 over GeoNetworking
IPv6 over GeoNetworking is used to support IPv6 based
communication with arbitrary higher level protocols over the
dedicated VANET network layer. Such protocols use meta
data, whose usage has to be preceded by message verification.
However, the core aim of IPv6 over GeoNetworking is to
use unchanged standard internet protocols. Thus, the VANET
network layer has to ensure verification of all messages passed
to an IPv6 interface. Hence, VoD is inappropriate for this kind
of communication as every single message has to be verified
to avoid attacks on higher level protocols or applications.
V. INTERACTION OF VERIFY-ON-DEMAND AND
CERTIFICATE HANDLING
Validation of a message is not limited to checking only
its own signature. Moreover, the certificate (chain) used to
secure the message needs to be verified, too. Within ETSI ITS
there are at most two levels of unverified certificates, which
are the pseudonym certificate (PSC) of the sending node and
the authorization authority certificate (AAC) which is used to
secure the PSC. The AAC is signed using a root certificate
known to all nodes in the VANET.
The PSC is individual per node. Thus, a rapidly changing
vehicular environment leads to reception of many different
PSCs. Hence, a high number of verifications is required for
a verify-all approach for PSCs. In contrast, the number of
AACs can be expected to be small (see also Section VI).
To avoid verification of certificates for messages which are
never verified, VoD should be extended to certificates as
well. Otherwise, the massive reduction of required verification
capabilities as outlined in [6] cannot be reached, due to
verification of many certificates.
Unfortunately, even certificates with valid format can be-
come quite large [16], [22]. With a verify-all strategy only
validated certificates are stored, but in case of VoD all unveri-
fied ones have to be stored, too. Thus, one has to take care that
memory for storing PSCs does not become a system bottleneck
in case of an attack. Moreover, the verification status has to
be stored for each certificate to avoid multiple verifications.
A separate storage for unverified certificates is recom-
mended in case the LDM design from [8] is used. Otherwise,
the LDM would also need to keep track of inter-message
dependencies of included parts of certificate chains, due to
sporadic and on-demand inclusion of certificates [11], [12].
This would add a lot of complexity to the LDM, apart from
increasing the interdependency of LDM and security entity.
One should note that this issue does not only affect ETSI
ITS, but WAVE as well. For WAVE the situation is even worse,
because the corresponding security standard does not limit the
amount of hierarchy levels of the PKI system [23].
VI. EFFICIENT DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK
Prior to the actual attack, the attacker stores valid PSCs,
which he extracts from received messages. To carry out the
attack, a stored PSC is added to the security envelope of a
message generated by the attacker. Thereby, the content of
the message is chosen in a way to be always regarded as
relevant for the attacked vehicle. Relevance criteria can be
easily obtained from the definitions of basic safety critical use
cases [3]. Moreover, the attacker uses a different PSC, and
thereby also different identifiers on all protocol layers, for each
message. The messages’ signatures consist of random data, as
the private keys for the PSCs are unknown to the attacker.
The described attack, enables an attacker to achieve multiple
goals at once. These include that for each sent message,
• the receiver regards the message as relevant for itself,
which leads to
• message verification including
1) verification of the formerly unknown PSC, which
will succeed and lead to
2) verification of the signature, which will fail.
Thus, each message sent by the attacker will lead to two
computationally expensive verifications. If the attacker can
send enough messages to supersede verification capabilities of
receivers, he can block or at least delay verification of valid
messages. This leads to a successful DOS attack on applica-
tions depending on data updates from received messages.
VoD schemes aim to massively limit the requirements for
verification capabilities at receivers [6]. Thus, even a quite
low number of faked messages, e.g., 10 per second, will
exceed the provided capabilities. Thus, the attacker does not
need dedicated equipment to jam the wireless channel or
increase the channel load by misusing protocol features like
described in [11], [12] to perform a DOS attack. Furthermore,
the attacker may be able carry out the attack without a need
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to violate legal regulations on usage patterns of the wireless
channel reserved for VANET communication.
Moreover, the faked messages can be targeted to a dedicated
node by using unicast communication at the network layer.
Thereby, the attack will go unnoticed by the rest of the
network. Both properties reduce the risk of the attacker to
be detected and punished.
The attacker can use CAMs and/or DENMs for his attack.
Thereby, usage of DENMs enables the attacker to attack
all vehicles in the (freely selectable!) relevance area of the
DENM. Verification before forwarding (see Section IV) limits
the impact to the communication range of the attacker.
The changing identifiers used by the attacker disable simple
countermeasures, like blocking of messages from senders after
reception of multiple invalid messages. Disabling entire classes
of messages, like DENMs containing a dedicated warning
type, can only limit the attack if the attacker uses just the
blocked dedicated type(s) of messages. However, the attacker
could just send a mix of all possible DENMs. Thus, blocking
of attacked message types would yield blocking all messages,
which leads to a successful DOS attack, too.
The amount of AACs can be assumed to be highly limited.
Otherwise, the attacker could send a valid certificate chain
(e.g., PSC and AAC) with all elements being unknown to
nodes. Thus, three verifications would be required for each
message. Within WAVE the length of the certificate chain
is not limited. Thus, the number of verifications required to
validate a single message can be even higher. However, it can
be assumed that the number of higher level certificates will be
small in practice. Thus, an attacker cannot provide enough of
them to enforce more than two verifications per message.
The described attack resembles the worst case scenario for
a VoD scheme, as no verification can be spared. To counter
the described attack, a system using VoD would need to have
verification capabilities equal to a verify-all scheme. However,
this clearly violates the objectives of the VoD design. Thus,
the found DOS weakness puts the VoD design into question
from a system robustness perspective.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Secured communication within VANETs is an important,
but yet challenging issue. Reduction of the signature verifica-
tion load within receivers by verify-on-demand (VoD) schemes
is a popular method to limit performance requirements.
The provided analysis shows that VoD leads to a significant
number of extra cross layer dependencies. Thus, overall com-
plexity of VANET protocol stacks is increased and separation
of dedicated communication layers is reduced. This holds
especially for approaches which store to be verified messages
within the facility layer LDM, e.g., [8]. Thus, we propose to
instead use storage within the cross layer security entity.
Moreover, the amount of interfaces which have to be
protected against malformed input from wireless attacks is
massively increased by VoD. Finally, the effort for performing
a successful DOS attack against dedicated nodes or groups of
nodes is significantly reduced by introduction of VoD.
Our findings lead to the conclusion that usage of VoD in
the currently proposed form is not recommended for VANETs.
Instead approaches of verify-all schemes, like in [5], should be
preferred. Moreover, future work could look for more compu-
tationally efficient algorithms for securing VANET messages.
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